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I. Introduction
In light of constant technological innovation, but infrequent legislative
updates,' the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC" or the
"Commission") faces a regulatory quandary. Should the Commission act
on frequent requests 2 that it apply existing regulations, or craft new ones to
* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State University, 102
Carnegie Building, University Park, PA 16802; (814) 863-7996; rmf5@psu.edu; http://www.pers
onal.psu.edu/faculty/r/m/rmf5.
1. The most recent revision of the primary telecommunications law in the United States
took place in 1996. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
2. See, e.g., Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008), vacated, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FCC exceeded
its statutory authority when responding to a complaint and imposing network neutrality rules).
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resolve real or anticipated interconnection disputes between and among
Internet carriers and content providers? Alternatively, should the FCC
refrain from expanding its regulatory wingspan unless and until it receives
explicit statutory authority? The answers to these questions substantially
affect the telecommunications and information marketplace, thus triggering
vigorous debate among stakeholders.
The ongoing question as to whether the FCC has a legislative mandate
and compelling need to regulate the terms and conditions for an open
Internet exacerbates the Commission's dilemma. Advocates for and
against network neutrality4 frequently use hyperbole to make their case, but
the FCC's decision whether to act will have profound consequences.
Refraining from establishing rules may facilitate anticompetitive practices
that harm consumers and the national economy. However, acting on the
basis of unproven harms can impose costs and generate disincentives for
investment in network upgrades.
3. See, e.g., Ivar A. Hartmann, A Right to Free Internet? On Internet Access and Social
Rights, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 297, 302 (2013); Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and
Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1033 (2012); Adam
Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Law and the Open Internet, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 493, 537-38,
547-48 (2012); Rob Frieden, Rationales for and Against Regulatory Involvement in
Resolving Internet Interconnection Disputes, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 266, 286 (2012); Dirk
Grunwald, The Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for Discrimination, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 411,
416-17 (2011); Rob Frieden, Assessing the Merits of Network Neutrality Obligations at Low,
Medium and High Network Layers, 115 PENN. ST. L. REv. 49, 50-51 (2010); Marvin Ammori,
Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61
FED. COMM. L.J. 273, 308-17 (2009).
4. See Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906-07
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order] aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub
nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), on remand; Protecting and Promoting the
Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 2014 WL 2001752 (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 Open Internet NPRM] (explaining that network neutrality refers to government-
mandated nondiscrimination, transparency, and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a
level competitive playing field among content providers and to establish consumer safeguards, so
that Internet users have unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns, such as ISP
network management and national security); see also REPORT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL LAYING DOwN MEASURES
CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKET FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TO
ACHIEVE A CONNECTED CONTINENT, AND AMENDING DIRECTIVES 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC
AND 2002/22/EC, AND REGULATIONS (EC) No 1211/2009 AND (EU) No 531/2012, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT (Mar. 20, 2014), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
pubRef--//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-0190+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN; EU Actions, DIGITAL
AGENDA FOR EUROPE, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/eu-actions (last visited Oct. 22,
2014); Catherine Jasserand, Critical Views on the French Approach to "Net Neutrality", 16 J.
INTERNET L. 18 (2013); NETWORK NEUTRALITY: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES IN THE E.U.
AND THE U.S. (2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/
201108/20110825 ATT25266/20110825ATT25266EN.pdf, Toshiya Jitsuzumi, Discussion on
Network Neutrality: Japan's Perspective, 3 COMM & CONVERGENCE REV. 71 (2011) (providing
background on network neutrality initiatives outside the United States).
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FCC managers may favor intervention because doing so expands the
scope and reach of the Commission's regulatory wingspan, typically
justifying more funding. On the other hand, FCC management needs to
consider the impact of any regulatory initiative on its record in convincing
appellate courts that statutory authority supports its action, or alternatively,
that its decisions on whether and how to act under ambiguous statutory
direction were reasonable.
Network neutrality poses particularly vexing challenges due to a
combination of factors. Examples include broad gaps in statutory
interpretation between interested parties, agitated consumers, complex
and conflicting framing of the issues, and the nearly universal view that
great harm will beset various stakeholders if the Commission intervenes or
fails to do so.' Advocates for regulatory action have not produced a
large and compelling empirical record of harm.6 They instead rely on
forecasts that biased networks will reduce the future value, accessibility,
and utility of the Internet.7 Opponents argue that regulatory intervention
to solve unproven harms imposes costs, including a net reduction in
innovation and investment in Internet infrastructure and applications.
This article will consider what roles, if any, the FCC may lawfully assume
to ensure timely and fair interconnection and compensation agreements
between Internet carriers and content providers. The article will examine the
FCC's limited role in broadcaster-multichannel video programming
distributors' ("MVPDs") retransmission consent negotiations with an eye
toward assessing the applicability of this model for current and future disputes.
5. Cf Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH L. 141, 149-50 (2003) (strongly advocating the need for network neutrality
safeguards); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 23,
65-68 (2004) (vigorously rejecting the need for, and benefits from, network neutrality).
6. For a frequently cited example of harmful operation of a biased and discriminatory
network, see Madison River Communications, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4296-97 (2005) (stating
that a small independent telephone company agreed to a $15,000 monetary forfeiture and consent
decree, and not to block Digital Subscriber Link customers' access to competitor's "Voice over
the Internet Protocol" telephone service).
7. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 65
(2007) (explaining that if a network "makes an exclusive deal with any high-speed application
source . . . then any other source will be second-best and may fail," and new customers "with
ideas for new online interactions may not be able to pay for any of these value-added services,"
thereby increasing "the risks to as-yet-unborn technologies and interactions").
8. E.g., Christopher Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO
L.J. 1847, 1853-54 (2005) ("[P]rohibiting last-mile providers from deviating from network
neutrality may actually harm consumers. Simply put, the current regime of flat-rate pricing and
unrestricted access discourages innovation in network management.").
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The FCC has stated that it lacks jurisdiction to prescribe specific financial
terms for broadcasters and MVPDs, to mandate binding arbitration,9 or to
mandate interim carriageo when the parties cannot reach closure and
consumers no longer have access to "must see" video content, such as
professional football games and other live programming. The FCC,
however, has interpreted its statutory authority to ensure "good faith"
negotiations" as allowing it to constrain broadcasters' negotiating leverage
by prohibiting the "Top Four" operators from joining in collective
negotiations with cable operators. 12
9. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 2718, 2727-28 (Mar. 3, 2011) ("We do not believe that
the Commission has authority to adopt either interim carriage mechanisms or mandatory binding
dispute resolution procedures applicable to retransmission consent negotiations."); see also id. at
2728-29 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ("[W]e believe that mandatory binding
dispute resolution procedures would be inconsistent with both Section 325 of the Act, in which
Congress opted for retransmission consent negotiations to be handled by private parties subject to
certain requirements, and with the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act ("ADRA"), which
authorizes an agency to use arbitration whenever all parties consent.").
10. The FCC explained that:
examination of the Act and its legislative history has convinced us that the
Commission lacks authority to order carriage in the absence of a broadcaster's
consent due to a retransmission consent dispute. Rather, Section 325(b) of the
Act expressly prohibits the retransmission of a broadcast signal without the
broadcaster's consent. Furthermore, consistent with the statutory language,
the legislative history of Section 325(b) states that the retransmission consent
provisions were not intended "to dictate the outcome of the ensuing
marketplace negotiations" and that broadcasters would retain the "right to
control retransmission and to be compensated for others' use of their signals."
We thus interpret Section 325(b) to prevent the Commission from ordering
carriage over the objection of the broadcaster, even upon a finding of a
violation of the good faith negotiation requirement.
Id. at 2728 (citations omitted).
11. Section 325 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 obligates broadcast stations and
MVPDs to negotiate retransmission consent in good faith. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C) (2014); see
also Meg Burton, Reforming Retransmission Consent, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 617, 631-32, 640-42
(2012). For an analysis of the good faith negotiation requirement along with recommendations for
better outcomes for consumers, see Darrel John Pae, Note, Toward a Fairer, Subscriber-
Empowered Multichannel Television Regime: Injecting Substance into the Good-Faith
Requirement on Retransmission Consent Negotiations, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 139, 146 (2013);
Sherli Yeroushalmi, With Court's Silence, FCC's 'Good Faith' Standard Has Left TV
Programmers and Distributors at Impasse, BLOOMBERG BNA INSIGITS (Oct. 28, 2013).
12. Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relating to Retransmission Consent, Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 3351, at *1 (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 Revised Retransmission Consent Rules] (citations omitted) (revising the
"'retransmission consent' rules ... to provide that joint negotiation by stations that are ranked
among the top four stations in a market .. . and are not commonly owned constitutes a violation of
the statutory duty to negotiate retransmission consent in good faith").
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Additionally, the FCC has identified two major unnecessary regulatory
constraints on MVPDs' content access' 3 in light of increased competition in
the video programming marketplace. The Commission eliminated the duty
to "blackout" delivery of duplicative broadcast network programming from
distant stations.1 4  The Commission has also proposed to eliminate the
requirement that MVPDs blackout syndicated programming, such as
Jeopardy and Wheel ofFortune available from distant broadcast stations.
This article will recommend that the FCC not define, or interpret, what
constitutes commercially reasonable interconnection and compensation
agreements for video carriage by MVPDs, or Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"). This article will suggest that the FCC apply the elements in the
retransmission consent model that limit the scope of its regulatory
intervention to establishing structural requirements in negotiations without
directly affecting the substantive terms of ISP agreements. Toward that
end, the FCC should use simple reporting requirements to assess the
timeliness of negotiations, and also provide a forum to identify and disclose
instances where stalling and other tactics possibly evidence bad faith. This
article concludes by suggesting that limited structural requirements
constitute both lawful and effective safeguards that do not intrude on the
commercial processes used by participants in the Internet ecosystem.
II. Technology, Design, and Market Imperatives Favor an
Open Internet
References to the Internet as a "network of networks,"1 6 or "cloud,"' 7
recognize the numerous interconnections and compensation arrangements
13. Id. at *20.
14. The sports blackout rules had prohibited MVPDs from retransmitting the signal of a
distant broadcast station carrying a sporting event within a protected local blackout zone if the
event is not available live on a local television broadcast station. Sports Blackout Rules, 79 Fed.
Reg. 63,547, 63,548 (Oct. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt 76). Local broadcasts
typically are contingent on ticket sales for attendance at the game to reach 85% to 100% at least
72 hours before the event. Id. at 63,551.
15. See, e.g., 2014 Revised Retransmission Consent Rules, supra note 12, at * 1 ("[W]e seek
comment on whether to modify or eliminate the Commission's network non-duplication and
syndicated exclusivity rules in light of changes in the video marketplace since these rules were
first adopted more than forty years ago.").
16. Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 816 (2004); see also Eli M. Noam, Beyond
Liberalization: From the Network of Networks to the System of Systems, 18 TELECOMM. POL'Y
286, 288, 294 (1994).
17. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the
Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and their content. "The
increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal computer. This shift
is being led by the growth of 'cloud computing'-the ability to run applications and store data on
a service provider's computers over the Internet, rather than on a person's desktop computer."
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necessary to achieve a complete routing of traffic from content source, or
storage location, to end users.' 8 Exempt from public utility common carrier
regulatory requirements,1 9 ISPs regularly engage in commercial
negotiations to reach interconnection agreements establishing the terms,
conditions, and compensation rates for the delivery of traffic.20 As the
Internet has evolved, these arrangements have diversified from a general
baseline dichotomy of using barter (peering), or transfer payments
(transiting).21 In particular, the downstream delivery of bandwidth
intensive video content, such as Internet Protocol Television ("IPTV"), 22
William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010).
18. One legal scholar explained the requirements needed to achieve Internet routing:
The Internet developed initially as an academic curiosity, based on a
commitment to the "end-to-end principle." This principle requires that all
Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
"call," or a video stream, be treated equally and managed through "best
efforts" connections. In such a network, data packets pass from one router to
another without the prioritization of any particular packets. In practice, this
means that Internet traffic reaches its destination at varying times, depending
on the traffic levels ofthe relevant Internet communications links.
Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 273, 277-78
(2008) (citation omitted).
19. These services qualify for a largely unregulated status. The Communications Act of
1934, as amended, defines telecommunications service as "the offering of telecommunications for
a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the
public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2014). Telecommunications is
defined as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the
user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received."
Id. § 153(50). Title II of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276, applies
nondiscrimination and other common carrier requirements on telecommunications service
providers. On the other hand, "information service" is defined as:
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any
use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
Id. § 153(24).
20. See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones,
11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 45 (2003) ("Internet backbone providers adopt and pursue their
own interconnection policies, governed only by ordinary laws of contract and property, overseen
by antitrust rules.").
21. See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture That Challenge the
Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 95-99 (2010) (outlining new ISP
interconnection variations of peering and transiting).
22. IPTV offers consumers with broadband connection options to download video files or
view (streaming) video content on an immediate "real time" basis. Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25
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has triggered new arrangements.2 3 Completed interconnection agreements
accommodate the interest of content providers and distributors in speedy,
high quality delivery of traffic, as well as ISPs' interest in profiting from
their additional investment in the switching and routing capacity needed
to handle such a massive increase in traffic volume. Content providers
and downstream ISPs, however, increasingly disagree on who should pay
for traffic carriage and on the rate of compensation, resulting in more
disputes and occasional disconnections. 24
The proliferation of "mission critical" bit streams containing "must
see" video has raised the stakes in negotiations among ISPs and between
ISPs and content sources. ISPs have invested in substantial upgrades to
accommodate subscriber demand for faster networks capable of handling
full motion video, but content providers also have made substantial
investments in products that consumers want to see. The combination of
consumer intolerance for service degradation and the need to negotiate with
specific ISPs providing "last mile" delivery of content to end users ("retail
ISPs") may place upstream ISPs and content ventures at a negotiation
disadvantage. MVPDs appear to have a similar bargaining handicap in
light of FCC rules that foreclose the option of finding a replacement source
of specific content, for example, substituting a distant broadcast signal
FCC Rcd. 3879 (Apr. 21, 2010) (final admin. review). Some of the available content duplicates
what cable television subscribers receive therein, which leads to disputes over whether cable
operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an IPTV service provider
from distributing the same content. See id at 3879-80 ("Sky Angel has been providing its
subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a half years, including the
Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, and the Military
Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a significant part of its service offering.").
For background on IPTV, see Robert Frieden, The Impact of Next Generation Television on
Consumers and the First Amendment, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61 (2013);
In-Sung Yoo, Note, The Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the
Federal Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation and
Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009).
23. John Meisel, Reactions by Broadband Service Providers to the Growth of Video
Streaming, 22 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 267, 267-68 (2014) (citations omitted) (explaining two
events occurred in the last few years that accompanied "the increase in last-mile wireline speed:
[flirst, there is an explosion of streaming video as the Internet's dominant form of traffic and,
second, there is a reconfiguration of the links in how large applications and content providers
transmit their data to the outer edges of broadband service providers' networks.").
24. See id. at 277 (stating "competing arguments for 'who should pay who' in interconnection
arrangements": (1) "one can try to identify who causes the traffic flow, end users or edge providers";
(2) "[ejdge providers argue that it is end users who demand/pull the data and, thus, it is the
responsibility of the BSP to ensure that its subscribers have the ability to access data with sufficient
capacity and functionality to accommodate the requests both within the local network and at points
of interconnection with other networks"; and, (3) "BSPs counter that it is the responsibility of edge
providers to ensure that the data arrives in a reliable and usable form to end users.")
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containing the same network, or syndicated programming as offered by a
local station that has rejected MVPD compensation proposals.2 5
Both retail ISPs and broadcasters may perceive an advantage in stalling
negotiations, perhaps with an eye toward enlisting broadband and MVPD
subscribers as their advocates. On the other hand, these ventures may face
the risk of consumer push-back and calls for regulatory intervention if they
overplay their hand. Regardless of underlying strategic considerations,
consumers have become increasingly inconvenienced as negotiations become
more protracted and expensive in both the broadcast-MVPD 2 6 and Internet
arenas.27 Consumers pay higher monthly subscriptions when MVPDs have
to pay more for content, and when upstream ISPs and content providers
have to pay more for delivery services.
Several high profile interconnection and compensation disputes
have involved major broadcast networks, such as CBS; and cable television
operators, such as Time Warner28 ; leading ISPs, such as Comcast
25. The FCC's Network Nonduplication rules currently permit a local broadcast television
station with exclusive rights to network programming to prohibit an MPVD from importing the
same content available from another station. 47 C.F.R. § 76.92 (2014). Syndicated exclusivity
rules prohibit an MVPD from importing non-network provided content, such as Jeopardy and
Wheel ofFortune. 47 C.F.R. § 76.151.
26. See Gregory J. Vogt, Does Retransmission Consent Need Fixing? (Or Do Consumers
Need Help So They Can Watch the Super Bowl, World Series, and Academy Awards?), 22
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 108, 111 (2014) ("The reality is that the number of retransmission
disputes is growing. This trend is likely to continue with increased competition among MVPDs
and mounting involvement by networks in local affiliate retransmission negotiations.").
27. For example, Netflix signed a paid peering agreement that may have resulted in higher
payments to Comcast in light of its substantial increases in downstream delivery. See Press
Release, Netflix, Comcast and Netflix Team Up to Provide Customers Excellent User Experience,
Feb. 23, 2014, available at http://corporate.comcast.com/news-information/news-feed/comcast-
and-netflix. One scholar explained "paid peering" as follows:
Paid peering, for example, resembles normal peering in almost every respect,
except that one network pays the other network even when the exchange of
traffic is roughly the same. These more sophisticated agreements reflect the
fact that while the traffic exchange may be equal, the cost of maintaining the
networks' respective infrastructures may be unequal. ISPs serving a smaller
number of large internet content websites (known as "content networks") have
lower costs in maintaining their infrastructure than ISPs serving home users
("eyeball networks"), since residential neighborhoods require more equipment
investment (such as wiring) and maintenance than commercial areas. These
interconnection agreements create the economic incentives for ISPs to route
internet traffic along the lowest-cost paths, which can sometimes have a
discriminatory effect on certain types of content, applications, and services.
Alexander Reicher, Note, Redefining Net Neutrality After Comcast v. FCC, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 733, 752 (2011) (emphasis added).
28. See Bill Carter, CBS Returns, Triumphant, to Cable Box, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2013,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/business/media/cbs-and-time-warner-cable-end-
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and Level 329; and major sources of content, such as Netflix.30 Protracted
disputes, well covered by the news media, have made the issue of
regulatory intervention more desirable to many consumers. To the FCC's
credit, it has refrained from overreacting with heavy-handed regulatory
intervention. The Commission, however, has asserted the need for its
involvement in retransmission consent negotiations between local television
broadcasters and MVPDs, 31 as well as in determining what constitutes
baseline requirements for an "open" video marketplace and Internet.32
As the markets for MVPD and IPTV services converge, the FCC may
consider it necessary and prudent to establish rules designed to ensure good
faith and fair dealing in both instances of content carriage. For example,
the FCC has proposed that ISPs bear the burden of proving "commercially
reasonable" deviations from the standard of nondiscriminatory, and "best
efforts," routing of Internet traffic. When parties reach a timely and
contract-dispute.html (reporting that after a protracted contract dispute with Time Warner, CBS not
only won "a significant financial increase for its programming, but also its stake in the digital
future"; and that "[t]he outcome underscored the leverage that the owners of important television
content, especially sports like N.F.L. football, retain over distributors like cable systems").
29. Compare Press Release, Level 3, Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning
Comcast's Actions, Nov. 29, 2010, available at http://www.level3.com/About-Us/Newsroom/
Press-Release-Archive/2010/2010-ll-29-level3-statement-comcast.aspx, with Joe Waz, 10 Facts
About Peering, Comcast and Level 3, COMCAST VOICES (Nov. 30, 2010), http://blog.com
cast.com/2010/11/10-facts-about-peering-comcast-and-level-3.html, and Joe Waz, Comcast
Comments on Level 3, COMCAST VOICES (Nov. 29, 2010) http://blog.comcast.com/2010/
11 /comcast-comments-on-level-3.html.
30. See generally Drew Fitzgerald & Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix-Traffic Feud Leads to
Video Slowdown, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2014 available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304899704579391223249896550; see also Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to
Pay Comcast for Smoother Streaming, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2014 available at http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304834704579401071892041790; Daniel L. Brenner &
Winston Maxwell, The Network Neutrality and the Netflix Dispute: Upcoming Challenges for
Content Providers in Europe and the United States, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2011);
Frieden, supra note 3, at 271.
31. 2014 Revised Retransmission Consent Rules, supra note 12.
32. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at *2, *7-15. Additionally, section 706(b) of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, section 1302(b) requires the FCC to conduct an
annual assessment on whether access to advanced telecommunications capabilities, such as
broadband, is available on a reasonable and timely fashion. 42 U.S.C. § 1302(b). If the FCC
determines such access is inadequate, it shall then "take immediate action to accelerate
deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by
promoting competition in the telecommunications market." Id.
33. Id. at *2. Where ISP interconnection "conduct would otherwise be permissible under the
no-blocking rule" barring the blockage of lawful content, the FCC proposed "to create a separate
screen that requires broadband providers to adhere to an enforceable legal standard of commercially
reasonable practices, asking how harm can best be identified and prohibited and whether certain
practices, like paid prioritization, should be barred altogether." Id. Moreover, the FCC stated:
While the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's rule prohibiting
unreasonable discrimination by fixed broadband providers on the theory that it
2015] 9
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uncoerced agreement, the Commission has little, if any, grounds to
question the commercial reasonableness of the negotiated outcome.
A. Arguments For and Against Biased Networks
One can rarely find consensus on many assumptions about the Internet
other than the near universal agreement that it has become a major medium
for access to information, communications and entertainment ("ICE").
Different, and somewhat conflicting, analogies provide a baseline frame of
reference. To some people, the Internet operates as an amorphous cloud
that receives, stores, and delivers content.34 Other analogies depict the
Internet as a series of tubes, a network of networks, 6 a broadband
communications supply chain,n a hierarchy of operating standards and
protocols, and a platform or interface for accessing content.3 8
The lack of consensus also extends to whether and how the Internet
should operate. Network neutrality advocates support a public utility
model where the FCC regulates ISPs as neutral conduit providers when
transmitting the content of other providers. 39 Opponents support market-
so limited broadband providers' control over edge providers' transmissions
that [it] constitute[d] common carriage per se, the court underscored the
validity of the commercially reasonable legal standard the Commission used
in the data roaming context and the court upheld in Cellco [Partnership v.
FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2012)].
Id. at *32 (quotation marks omitted).
34. See 2014 Revised Retransmission Consent Rules, supra note 12, at *1.
35. See ANDREW BLUM, TUBES: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE INTERNET, Prologue (2012).
36. See ELI M. NOAM, INTERCONNECTING THE NETWORK OF NETWORKS 1-4 (2001).
37. See Arturo Muente-Kunigami, Digital Inclusion: Beyond Access to Broadband, Figure
1, IC4D BLOG (Feb. 22, 2011), http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/digital-inclusion-beyond-access-
to-broadband.
38. See Richard S. Whitt, A Deference to Protocol: Fashioning a Three-Dimensional Public
Policy Framework for the Internet Age, 31 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 689, 726 (2013); Richard
S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet
Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 431 (2009).
39. Many network neutrality advocates believe the FCC should treat Internet access as
regulated common carriage subject to Title II of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-261
(2013). To impose such duties, the FCC would have to reclassify Internet access from
information service to telecommunications service, for example:
Under the "Third Way" approach that the Commission announced in 2010, the
Commission would first issue an order reclassifying broadband as a
"telecommunications service," subjecting it to Title II regulation. This would
give the Commission the solid legal foundation it would need to regulate
broadband, as broadband would now be subject to the express provisions of Title
II. Second, the Commission would then use its forbearance authority under
Section 160 to exempt broadband from most of the Title II regulations it would
have otherwise been subject to due to the reclassification. Only a handful of
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driven options where ISPs can discriminate on the basis of price, quality of
service, and traffic routing priority. 4 0 At its inception, the basic topology and
operating parameters of the Internet favored openness, modularity, and a
layered hierarchy of functions.4 1  This Internet architecture favors
widespread diffusion of content and intelligence rather than concentration
at core locations. The phrase "dumb pipe" may understate the intelligence
of Internet networks, but the reference emphasizes a design favoring
intelligence at the edges of networks, on users' premises, rather than within
the transmission links themselves.4 2
The early emphasis on intelligence at the edge evidenced an
appreciation that the Internet could become ubiquitous and essential only if
consumers could access widely dispersed content using seamlessly
interconnecting networks that jointly participate in the routing of traffic.4 3
Similarly, the protocols designed for the Internet favor connectivity
and openness. The network of networks depiction of the Internet
underscores network compatibility regardless of geographical location of
content, who operates the networks used to route traffic, or the
manufacturer or age of network equipment used. Concepts like "end-to-
end" connectivity44 support best efforts routing throughout the entire
Internet ecosystem.
Title II provisions would then be applied to broadband, but those provisions
would be enough for the Commission to achieve its regulatory goals.
Andrew Lipkowitz, Reshaping the Last Mile: Amending the Telecommunications Act to Spur
Competition in the Broadband Internet Market, 27 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 289, 308-09 (2014).
40. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1, 6 (2005)
(arguing that the key inquiry "when deciding whether to impose network neutrality as a
regulatory mandate," is "whether circumstances exist in which deviations from network
neutrality would create benefits that would be foreclosed if network neutrality were imposed.");
see also id. at 7 ("In the absence of a clear competitive harm, the standard response under
competition policy is to forbear from categorically prohibiting the challenged practice and instead
to evaluate its effect on competition on a case-by-case basis.")
41. Christopher S. Yoo, Protocol Layering and Internet Policy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1707,
1711-12 (2013) (explaining how a layered and structured design architecture has costs, including
potential losses in innovation and flexibility).
42. Frederick W. Pfister, Note, Net Neutrality: An International Policy for the United
States, 9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 167, 171 (2007) ("Internet intelligence resides at the ends of
the network. There, a user's device or server does the heavy lifting and determines if the
received data is intended for it. This leads to the phenomenon of the so-called 'dumb'
network."); see generally, J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed & D. D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in
System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER SyS., 277 (1984).
43. See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 347 (2008) (explaining the structure of
the Internet and its "seamless collective nature" that "allows all users, application creators, and content
providers to leverage the full power of the global inter-network").
44. See David D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and
Application Design: The Role of Trust, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 357, 364-65 (2011); Mark A. Lemley
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The decision by governments to underwrite development of the
Internet through grants, subsidies, and early adoption of use helped support
the concept of neutrality while deflecting, or ignoring, important issues
about cost recovery.45 With taxpayers bearing the financial cost of network
research and deployment,4 6 carriers could concentrate on expanding the
Internet's reach, accessibility, and capacity without paying much attention
to the cost of upgrades and which carriers and users triggered the need for
costly network upgrades. At its inception, the Internet operated as a shared
and widely available medium with carriers keen on finding new partners in
their shared mission of expanding geographical reach.47
Carriers operating in the first generation of the Internet used a barter
arrangement, often lacking comprehensive terms and conditions, when
agreeing to interconnect their separate networks. 4 8  This process of
peering 49 operated under the assumption that carriers' traffic volumes were
nearly equal,so or that imbalances did not matter because government
subsidies would defray costs.51  Put another way, the first ISPs assumed
traffic metering was too costly or unnecessary.
A heritage favoring efforts to promote seamless network
interconnections lives on despite changes in the Internet ecosystem-most
notably the replacement of government subsidies by a largely commercial
& Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930-31 (2001).
45. See Whitt, supra note 38, at 701 ("[T]he Internet's open architecture was a fundamental
principle that was a hallmark of the government research effort, one that would not have come
about if the Net had been created instead by private industry.").
46. See Robert Pepper, Policy Changes Necessary to Meet Internet Development, 2001 L.
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 255, 255-56 (2001) ("[T]he Internet was developed with
government subsidy ... through government contracts.... The first real government
involvement in developing the Internet, as we know it today, came from contracts that the
National Science Foundation (NSF) gave to providers of network services.").
47. For background on the history of Internet development, see Barry M. Leiner et al., A
Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET Soc'Y (2003), available at http://www.isoc.org/intemet
history/brief.shtml; see also Frieden, supra note 3, at 273-83 (identifying and describing four phases
in Internet development).
48. See Kende, supra note 20, at 52 ("[C]ompanies will peer when they perceive equal
benefit from peering based on their own subjective terms, rather than any objective terms.").
49. For background on the peering process, see Geoff Huston, Internet Peering and
Settlements, APNIC, http://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/i*orgs/number-misuse/internet-
peering-and-settlements; DrPeering.net: Resources to Make Strategic Peering Decisions,
DRPEERING INT'L, http://www.drpeering.net (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
50. See Dirk Grunwald, supra note 3, at 427 ("Most ... peering relationships have been historically
'settlement free' because they benefit both parties and because traffic demands were symmetrical.").
51. See Philip J. Weiser, The Ghost of Telecommunications Past, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1671,
1673 (2005) ("[T]he Internet was nurtured by government subsidies and it developed as it did-as
an open platform for innovation-because of regulatory decisions made by the government, such
as ensuring that the telephone lines that carried Internet traffic did not favor certain applications
or uses over others.").
marketplace. Absent government subsidies, ISPs need to recoup sizeable
and frequent investments in next generation network equipment from
subscribers and other carriers.52 As the type and number of ISPs increased,
new financial compensation arrangements evolved, particularly ones to
address interconnection between carriers having no likelihood of equal
traffic volumes.53  "Transiting" refers to arrangements where an ISP,
lacking parity of traffic volume, capacity, subscribers, attractive content
sources, switching resources, or geographical reach agrees to compensate
another ISP for accepting traffic and routing it onward to other ISPs, or to
the intended final destination.54
As the Internet has privatized, commercialized, and diversified, ISPs
have had to balance the primary goal of promoting greater accessibility
and geographical coverage with perhaps more pedestrian, but essential,
financial considerations. Absent a third party underwriter, ISPs must rely
on revenue from their subscribers and other ISPs to recoup and earn a return
on investments. Many ISPs, particularly the largest ones providing
backbone transcontinental and transoceanic routes, faced the unenviable
task of renegotiating peering agreements and replacing a "bill and keep,"
zero-transfer payment barter system, with one (such as transiting) that
required payments.55
It should come as no surprise that fully privatized ISPs, operating in a
largely unregulated commercial environment, seek new revenue and profit
centers. These carriers revisited the policy favoring "best efforts" routing
and identified new avenues for diversification based on price, quality of
service discrimination, and routing priority.5 6
One can consider these new arrangements as sensible and as evidence
of a maturing and diversifying Internet.s7 Not all forms of price and quality
52. For background on the replacement of government subsidies, see Rob Frieden, Internet
Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power
Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 633, 647-48 (2008).
53. See Yoo, supra note 21, at 95 (2010) ("Network providers have also begun to enter into business
relationships that go beyond peering and transit relationships that dominated the early Internet.").
54. Kende, supra note 20, at 50.
55. Paid Internet Peering on the Rise, Disputes Possible, COMM. DAILY, July 1, 2013,
available at http://www.cs.columbia.edu/-misra/news/CD070113.pdf.
56. Stacey Higginbotham, Peering Pressure: The Secret Battle to Control the Future of the
Internet, GIGAOM (June 19, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/06/19/peering-pressure-the-secret-
battle-to-control-the-future-of-the-internet/.
57. For background on peering, transit, and new interconnection arrangements, see Dennis
Weller & Bill Woodcock, Internet Traffic Exchange, OECD DIGITAL ECON. PAPERS NO. 207
(Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/internet-traffic-exchange-5
k9l8gptl3Oq-en; see also Anna-Maria Kovacs, Internet Peering and Transit (Apr. 4, 2012),
available at http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/amkinternetpeeringandtransit.pdf.
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of service discrimination serve ulterior motives to favor corporate affiliates,
or parties willing to pay a surcharge. Indeed, the torrent of downstream
traffic, represented by full motion video content, necessitates
accommodations because traffic for many carriers has become substantially
asymmetrical: far more downstream than upstream traffic. For example, a
new category of ISP, known as a Content Distribution Network ("CDN"),"
has a business plan for targeting video content sources and distributors-
for example, Netflix-and providing them with the massive downstream
bandwidth they require to reach subscribers.59
On the other hand, any form of network bias-no matter how sensible,
desirable, and commercially successful-runs counter to the still widely
embraced concept that conduit neutrality should foreclose most, if not all,
types of discrimination.60 Notwithstanding this general disposition,
Internet subscribers most certainly want ISPs to promote greater certainty
that "mission critical" bits arrive without degradation, particularly if
congested network conditions exist. Netflix subscribers expect timely
delivery of bandwidth-intensive video traffic. Their pain threshold for
degraded service starts as soon as the content freezes or blurs. Similarly,
network neutrality advocates do not appear to have a problem with content
sources and distributors installing proxy servers or retaining the services of
CDNs, such as Akamai, that use these devices to distribute content closer
to end users. Such "better than best efforts" traffic routing reduces the
number of routers traversed and the distance that traffic must travel to
reach end users, as well as the total elapsed delivery time (latency).
It appears that network neutrality advocates concentrate on the last mile
delivery of traffic by retail ISPs because of the assumption that these
carriers have the greatest incentive and ability to discriminate in ways that
58. For background on the rise of content delivery networks and its affect on the market, see
Kevin Werbach, No Dialtone: The End of the Public Switched Telephone Network, 66 FED.
COMM. L.J. 203, 240 (2014).
59. Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy's Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband Pricing, 66
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 8 (2013) ("To avoid transit fees and to route content more quickly to its
destination, some content providers choose instead to purchase access from private content-delivery
networks such as Akamai or Limelight, which also typically charge customers based on volume.").
60. See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Introducing the Comcast Tax, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 24,
2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-02-24/introducing-the-comcast-tax; Tim Wu,
Comcast Versus the Open Internet, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 24, 2014, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2014/02/comcast-versus-the-free-internet.html.
61. Content providers and distributors can opt to negotiate directly with retail ISPs for the
right to install ("co-locate") equipment on site, or alternatively secure the services of a company,
such as Akamai, to negotiate, install and maintain the equipment. Netflix has sought the direct
negotiation option with ISPs. See Ken Florance, Announcing the Neflix Open Connect Network,
NETFLIX U.S. AND CANADA BLOG (June 4, 2012), http:/iblog.netflix.com/2012/06/announcing-
netflix-open-connect-network.html.
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harm consumers and competition. Advocates for network neutrality
express concerns that, without regulatory oversight, ISPs providing the
final leg of a complete end-to-end service will engage in anticompetitive
practice. For example, retail ISPs may generate artificial congestion with
an eye toward forcing upstream ISPs and content sources to pay surcharges
for traffic routing that previously triggered neither congestion nor an
additional duty to compensate the downstream carrier.62 Network
neutrality proponents contend that, absent regulatory oversight, ISPs will
engage in unreasonable price and quality of service discrimination to favor
corporate affiliates while surcharging competitors.63 Such discrimination
could generate artificial congestion that an ISP might create to handicap a
specific ISP or content source unless, and until, they agreed to pay a surcharge.
B. Distinguishing Reasonable and Unreasonable Discrimination
Currently, the FCC has classified all forms of Internet access as
information services 64 not subject to Title II common carrier regulation. 6 5
62. Washington Correspondent Grant Gross for IDG News Service explained network
traffic congestion:
Traffic congestion at interconnection points between broadband
providers and backbone providers doesn't appear to be widespread, with
congestion often just two or three hours a day, said David Clark, a senior
research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Computer
Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory and one of the researchers
investigating congestion complaints.
But in some cases, U.S. ISPs have experienced periods of congestion on
interconnection points with backbone providers that last for months at a time,
Clark said Wednesday. Still, many of the problems of congestion seem to
point to disagreements over business arrangements related to mismatches
between network capacity and demand, he said during a congressional
briefing on traffic congestion.
Grant Gross, Internet Traffic Congestion Real, but Sporadic, Study Says, PCWORLD (June 18,
2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2365320/intemet-traffic-congestion-real-but-sporadic-study
-says.html; see also Matthew Luckie, Amogh Dhamdhere, Bradley Huffake & Young Hyun,
INTERNET INTERDOMAIN CONGESTION (2014), available at http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/
2014/challengesjinferring-interdomain congestion/challenges inferring-interdomain-congestion.pdf
63. Mick Masnick, Level3 Proves That Verizon Is Absolutely to Blame for Netflix
Congestion Using Verizon's Own Blog Post, TECHDIRT (July 18, 2014), https://www.
tech dirt.com/articles/20140718/06533327927/level3-proves-that-verizon-is-absolutely-to-blame-
netflix-congestion-using-verizons-own-data.shtml (reporting on conflicting explanations as to
why Netflix traffic traversing Verizon network facilities had become congested).
64. See 47 U.S.C. §153(41).
65. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Red. 4798, 4821 (2002), aff'd
sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78
(2005); see also Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC.Rcd. 14853, 14863-64 (2005), petition for rev. den., Time Warner Telecom,
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Even if the FCC were to reclassify Internet access as a telecommunications
service, subject to the nondiscrimination requirements contained in Title 11,66
the Commission would still have to make ad hoc determinations on the
reasonableness of particular carrier practices and whether a carrier offers
"like services" on the same terms and conditions. 67 The FCC has devoted
decades to these endeavors, regularly having to defend its interpretation of
what efforts telecommunications service providers must undertake
consistent with their common carrier status. 6 8  For example, the FCC
undertook several regulatory initiatives to promote competition for local
telecommunications services consistent with an explicit mandate contained
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The FCC first received generally
supportive appellate review of initiatives, but over time, intrusive and
burdensome requirements, such as compulsory unbundling of service
elements and below market pricing of access, failed to achieve sustainable
competition as they created disincentives for investment in infrastructure
upgrades by incumbent carriers.
The FCC has identified two options for securing direct statutory
authority to regulated broadband services: (1) under Title II, the
Commission reclassifies broadband as an information services, or (2) the
Commission interprets section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
199669 as authorizing it to impose non-common carrier rules on ISPs. In
either instance, the FCC cannot prohibit rates, terms, conditions, tiers,
Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007); United Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory
Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an
Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC.Rcd. 13281 (2006); Appropriate
Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, Declaratory
Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007).
66. Title II of the Communications Act imposes a number of requirements on
telecommunication service providers including the duty to operate without discrimination, to
interconnect with other carriers, and to provide service to all qualified consumers. See 47 U.S.C.
§§ 201-276 (2014).
67. Id. §§ 201(a)-(b), 202(a), 251(c)(3).
68. See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, 15508 (1996) (first report and order),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999);
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696, 3905 (1999) (third report and order and fourth further notice of
proposed rulemaking), rev'd and remanded, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d
415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers, 18 FCC Red. 16978, 16983 (2003), vacated and remanded in part,
aff'd in part, U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Unbundled
Access to Network Elements, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533, 2534 (Feb. 4, 2005) (order on remand).
69. PUB. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153 (1996), as amended in relevant part by the
Broadband Data Improvement Act, PUB. L. No. 110-385, 122 Stat. 4096 (2008), codijled at 47
U.S.C. § 1301 ("BDIA"). Section 706 is reproduced in the notes to section 157 of the
Communications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 157.
features, carrier practices, and service options made available to all
"similarly situated" carriers and consumers.70 Discrimination regularly
satisfies the reasonableness criterion if end users, or other carriers, opt for a
service, even on specialized terms and conditions. Discrimination may
become unreasonable if the providing carrier itself makes the determination
whether to apply terms and conditions selectively and arbitrarily. On the
issue of Internet access, quality of service discrimination created by
proxy server installations would pass muster because the venture
providing this option typically offers it on a nonexclusive basis to anyone
on commercially negotiated terms.
The certainty, however, that reasonable discrimination can and should
occur, does not eliminate the possibility that ISPs unilaterally may opt to
engage in unreasonable and unlawful discrimination. Due to the integrated
nature of end-to-end routing, the FCC would have a difficult time
distinguishing between degraded service caused by real congestion versus
artificially created congestion. The former results when an ISP cannot
handle peak traffic conditions as a result of insufficient bandwidth,
switching capacity, and interconnection ports. The latter results when an
ISP deliberately causes degraded service in handling specific content
sources or types of content.
Should the FCC have any basis to get involved, its first function would
be to conduct a forensic examination as to the cause of congestion or any
other type of service interruption.7 1  But even before a threshold decision
70. "Although the Act does not expressly require general offerings, the Act does require the
carriers to establish charges that do not result in 'unreasonable' discrimination among customers
of 'like' telecommunications services. This obligation is normally interpreted as requiring that
carrier offerings be generally available to all similarly situated customers." Local Exchange
Carriers' Individualized Case Basis DS3 Service Offerings, 4 FCC.Rcd. 8634, 8642 (1989)
(Tariff I Order) (citing Sea Land Services, Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir.1984));
AT&T Communications, 4 FCC Rcd. 4932, 4938 (1989) (Tariff 12 Order), recon. denied, 4 FCC
Rcd. 7928 (1989); Letter from Thomas D. Wyatt, Chief, Formal Complaints and Investigations
Branch, FCC, To Michael L. Glaser & Joseph P. Benkert, Hopper and Kanouff, P.C., DA 93-771,
Letter 8 FCC Red. 4384 (1993). .
71. The FCC may find it difficult to determine a single cause for temporary or chronic
congestion and service degradation. For example, in early 2014 Netflix subscribers experienced
deterioration in service that the company attributed to retail ISPs' efforts to demand surcharge
payments in light of increased traffic volume. Retail ISPs, such as Comcast, responded that they
had undertaken no strategy to cause slower delivery speeds for Netflix traffic. ISPs claimed
Netflix triggered congestion by releasing all episodes of blockbuster content instead of the
conventional release of single episodes per week. Fitzgerald & Ramachandran, supra note 30
("The hit political drama series of Netflix kept about 60,000 subscribers glued onto their screens
on Valentine's Day to watch the whole 13-hour production. However, the shifting behavior of
consumers to watch videos on demand over the Internet is causing some clogged pipes on the
information highway."); see also Randell Suba, Neflix-Verizon Standoff Only Net Neutrality
Can Now Stop Video Slowdown, TECH TIMES (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.
techtimes.com/articles/3670/20140223/netflix-verizon-standoff-only-net-neutrality-can-now-stop-
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whether and how the FCC should get involved lies the issue of what
predictable outcomes can occur if the carriers and their clients work
diligently to resolve disputes by themselves.
III. Broadcaster-MVPD Retransmission Consent Negotiations
Network neutrality opponents suggest that commercially driven
negotiations between and among ISPs and content providers offer a more
timely, efficient, and customizable solution in lieu of FCC intervention.72
This model constitutes the predominant way Internet carriers agree to
handle the traffic generated by other carriers. With rare exception, the Internet
cloud has maintained widespread, redundant, competitive, and efficient traffic
routing upstream from retail ISPs that use peering and transit agreements,
as well as specialized arrangements provided by ventures such as Akamai.
Subscribers of broadband services typically do not experience service
interruptions or degradation as a result of insufficient network capacity
upstream from their retail ISPs. Ample competition exists as evidenced by
significant reductions in the cost of long-haul broadband carriage.74
Network neutrality advocates concentrate on the first and last mile of traffic
provided by retail ISPs because these segments in the Internet ecosystem
may lack all of the characteristics supporting fair and timely commercial
arrangements. Retail ISPs use the same commercial negotiation models as
their upstream counterparts, but also have the opportunity to exploit
superior negotiating leverage in light of their status as the sole carrier that
provides access from and to the Internet cloud for a significant percentage
of end users.
The question whether fair commercial negotiations can occur between
parties may arise, but the FCC would be hard pressed to generate lawful
criteria for assessing what constitutes commercial reasonableness,
particularly when the buyer and seller reach closure on terms. One can
dismiss as buyer's remorse claims of unfair or coercive treatment
video-slowdown.htm; Dan Rayburn, Here's How the Comcast & Netflix Deal Is Structured, With
Data & Numbers, STREAMING MEDIABLOG.COM (Feb. 27, 2014), http://blog.streamingmedia.
com/2014/ 02/heres-comcast-netflix-deal-structured-numbers.html.
72. Lyons, supra note 59, at 5-6 ("Absent a specific market failure .. . broadband providers
should be free to experiment with usage-based pricing and other pricing strategies . ... Public
policies allowing providers the freedom to experiment best preserve the spirit of innovation that
has characterized the Internet since its inception.").
73. In 2008, Sprint and Cogent "de-peered" their networks, causing temporary service
disruptions between their customers. See Om Malik, Cogent, Sprint Disconnect Networks, May
Cause Web Slowdown, GIGAOM (Oct. 30, 2008), http://gigaom.com/2008/10/30/cogent-sprint-
un-peer-may-cause-web-slowdown.
74. See, e.g., TELEGEOGRAPHY, IP Transit Price Declines Slow Globally (Sept. 24, 2014),
http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2014/09/24/ip-transit-price-declines-
slow-globally/.
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nevertheless accepted by an ISP or content provider. However, consumers
may suffer if a party lacks good faith in negotiations, knowing that stalling
can bolster negotiating leverage and result in better terms at a later date.
Bear in mind that consumers have a very low pain threshold for
degradation in picture quality when streaming downloaded video content.
Retail ISPs might attempt to extract more generous terms simply by
refraining from making a conscientious effort to abate real congestion, or
worse by actively taking steps designed to degrade bitstreams originating
from the carrier or content source with which the ISP is negotiating.
A model exists for assessing the FCC's role in promoting timely and good
faith negotiations without direct intervention and interference with the
commercial negotiation process or the substantive outcome. The Commission
has a limited role specified by law in its oversight of negotiations between
television broadcasters and MVPDs,7 5 such as cable television and Direct
Broadcast Satellite operators, for the retransmission of broadcast television
channels. The FCC can lawfully assess whether parties have negotiated in
good faith, but cannot specify terms, mandate arbitration, or determine
whether a negotiated settlement satisfies a commercially reasonableness
standard.76 Additionally the FCC cannot order the parties to maintain the
status quo in terms of carriage rights and compensation terms after a
contract renewal deadline.n
The broadcaster-MVPD retransmission model has both similarities and
differences compared to ISP interconnection and compensation negotiations.
In both categories, the parties engage in a mutually beneficial transaction
75. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Fifteenth Report, 28 FCC Rcd. 10496, 10503 (2013) ("As defined by
statute, an MVPD is an entity that makes available for purchase multiple channels of video
programming. Thus, the MVPD group includes cable operators, DBS operators, and telephone
companies that offer multiple channels of video programming.").
76. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, MB Docket
No. 10-71, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 2718, 2727-28 (2011) ("We do not believe
that the Commission has authority to adopt either interim carriage mechanisms or mandatory binding
dispute resolution procedures applicable to retransmission consent negotiations.").
77. The FCC explained that:
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992...
amended the Communications Act, inter alia, to include Section 325, which
provides television stations with certain carriage rights on local market cable
television systems.... [T]he statute does not intend to subject retransmission
consent negotiation to detailed substantive oversight by the Commission.
Instead, the order concludes that Congress intended that the Commission
follow established precedent, particularly in the field of labor law, in
implementing the good faith retransmission consent negotiation requirement.
Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Retransmission Consent
Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, CS Docket No. 99-363, First Report and Order,
15 FCC Rcd. 5445, 5447-48 (2000).
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that reaches closure in the vast majority of instances before
interconnection and carriage must stop. The emphasis on retransmission
consent, however, lies in payment for access to content, with the MVPD
absorbing the cost of last mile delivery, while the ISP negotiations cover the
cost of carriage with no compensation for the value of the content carried.
Both ISPs and MVPDs must confront industry and regulatory
conditions that trigger deviations from a fully functioning and completely
unfettered marketplace. Each group must deal with specific counterparts in
an "arranged marriage" of sorts. ISPs have to negotiate with specific retail
ISPs that provide the only last mile link for terminating traffic to end users.
In the United States, most retail broadband subscribers choose between
broadband options provided by incumbent cable television and telephone
companies.78 Satellite broadband providers offer comparatively slower bit
transmission speeds, have lower caps on allotted downloads per month,
charge higher rates, and require payments for necessary receiving
equipment.7 9 Additionally, higher latency-caused by the distance to and from
satellites-can disrupt some uses. The newest generation of terrestrial
wireless service provides a broadband option, albeit one with much smaller
downloading allotments, making the per-megabyte cost of service
significantly higher than wireline options.80 Broadband consumers typically
subscribe to one carrier to handle all of their Internet access requirements.
78. For example, as the FCC stated:
In the Open Internet Order, the Commission found that providers of
broadband Internet access service had multiple incentives to limit Internet
openness. The Order concluded that the threat of broadband provider
interference with Internet openness would be exacerbated by-but did not
depend on-such providers possessing market power over potential
subscribers in their choice of broadband provider. However, the Commission
found that most residential customers have only one or two options for
wireline broadband Internet access service, increasing the risk of market
power, and found the future of mobile Internet access service as a competing
substitute remained unclear. Moreover, the Commission emphasized that
customers may incur significant costs in switching from one provider to
another, thus creating "terminating monopolies" for content providers
needing high-speed broadband service to reach end users.
2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at 12 (citing 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at
17923-24).
79. See, e.g., Satellite Internet Availability & Pricing for Exede, WILDBLUE, http://www.
wildblue.com/options/availability-results?availabilityZip=16802&availabilitySubmit-submit (last
visited Sept. 20, 2014).
80. See, e.g., The MORE Everything Plan, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verizonwire
less.com/wcms/consumer/shop/shop-data-plans/more-everything.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
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A. Limited Structural Regulation of Retransmission Negotiations
The existence of MVPD market power and the importance of
broadcasters' local service prompted Congress in 1992 to impose a
mandatory, "must carry" right of carriage for broadcasters or the option to
secure compensation from MVPDs.8 ' MVPD market share has declined
since 1992 with the onset of new facilities-based competition and the
option of using the Internet to deliver video programming. 82 However, the
FCC's retransmission rules have not markedly changed. Broadcasters have
substantially increased retransmission compensation demands now that the
balance of power in negotiations has shifted in their favor.83 In the case of
broadcast network owned and operated stations, MVPDs have agreed to
carry several channels affiliated or owned by the broadcast network,
regardless of their ratings or attractiveness to consumers. 84
While the FCC has statutory authority "to govern the exercise by
television broadcast stations of the right to grant retransmission consent,"85
the Commission has limited its involvement to promoting good faith
negotiations between local television broadcasters and MVPDs. This
authority accords the Commission significant flexibility so long as it can
identify an impediment to closure that raises questions whether a party
has acted in good faith.86 The FCC has created two tests for its evaluation:
(1) an objective test identifying specific violations of the good faith standard;
and (2) a subjective test considering the totality of circumstances.87
81. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, PUB. L. No. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
82. See, e.g., Edmund Lee, TV Subscriptions Fall for First Time as Viewers Cut the Cord,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-19/u-s-pay-tv-
subscriptions-fall-for-first-time-as-streaming-gains.html ("The number of Americans who pay for
TV through cable, satellite or fiber services fell by more than a quarter of a million in 2013, the
first full-year decline, according to research firm SNL Kagan. If the slide continues in the
coming years, that means 2012 was the industry's high point.").
83. See Chairman Thomas Wheeler, OFFICIAL FCC BLOG, Protecting Television Consumers
by Protecting Competition (Mar. 6, 2014), available at http://www.fcc.govlblog/protecting-
television-consumers-protecting-competition ("The cost of these 'retransmission consent
agreements' has skyrocketed from $28 million in 2005 to $2.4 billion in 2012, a nearly 8,600
percent increase in seven years.").
84. Jade Brewster, Cracking The Cable Conundrum: Government Regulation of A La Carte
Models in the Cable Industry, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE, 20, 26-27 (2014) (explaining the
"standoff' created by "[t]he refusal of the cable companies to pay for the big networks' content").
85. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(A) (2014).
86. Id. § 325(b)(3)(C)(ii) (imposing a reciprocal duty to negotiate in good faith by
broadcasters and MVPDs).
87. Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, 15 FCC Rcd.
5445, 5448 (2000). See 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(1)(2013) for the objective test criteria:
The following actions or practices violate a broadcast television station's or
multichannel video programming distributor's (the "Negotiating Entity') duty
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In both retransmission consent and ISP interconnection negotiations,
the balance of power skews to one group of negotiators based on their
superior bargaining leverage. Broadcasters exclusively offer "must see"
television content and retail ISPs control the last mile content distribution
link exclusively relied upon by consumers. Broadcasters typically extract
concessions from MVPDs in the form of increasing retransmission
compensation because a significant percentage of MVPD subscribers will
not tolerate the loss of particularly compelling, "must see" content, such as
regular season professional football and other live programming.88
Additionally, the FCC's rules force MVPDs to secure retransmission
consent only from local broadcasters because network non-duplication and
syndicated exclusivity rules currently in force prohibit MVPDs from
importing duplicative content from another distant station89 that offers the
same syndicated programming or transmitting the same broadcast network
programming. The substantial increase in retransmission consent revenues
to negotiate retransmission consent agreements in good faith: (i) Refusal by a
Negotiating Entity to negotiate retransmission consent; (ii) Refusal by a
Negotiating Entity to designate a representative with authority to make
binding representations on retransmission consent; (iii) Refusal by a
Negotiating Entity to meet and negotiate retransmission consent at reasonable
times and locations, or acting in a manner that unreasonably delays
retransmission consent negotiations; (iv) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to
put forth more than a single, unilateral proposal; (v) Failure of a Negotiating
Entity to respond to a retransmission consent proposal of the other party,
including the reasons for the rejection of any such proposal; (vi) Execution by
a Negotiating Entity of an agreement with any party, a term or condition of
which, requires that such Negotiating Entity not enter into a retransmission
consent agreement with any other television broadcast station or multichannel
video programming distributor; and (vii) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to
execute a written retransmission consent agreement that sets forth the full
understanding of the television broadcast station and the multichannel video
programming distributor.
Moreover, see 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(2)(2013) for the subjective criterion:
In addition to the standards set forth in § 76.65(b)(1), a Negotiating Entity
may demonstrate, based on the totality of the circumstances of a particular
retransmission consent negotiation, that a television broadcast station or
multichannel video programming distributor breached its duty to negotiate in
good faith as set forth in § 76.65(a).
88. See Vogt, supra note 26, at 119 ("Expirations of retransmission consent agreements are
now loud, public affairs punctuated by ad campaigns by the relevant MVPD and broadcast
station, each blaming the other for any impasse in negotiations and the possibility of a blackout,
in which the broadcaster will withdraw its programming from the MVPD."); see also Carter,
supra note 28 (discussing a contract dispute between CBS and Time Warner Cable that affected
the "owners of important television content, especially sports like N.F.L. football").
89. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-76.130 (2013).
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accrued by broadcasters evidences superior bargaining leverage that
broadcasters have in light of many different types of MVPDs-cable,
satellite, and telephone companies-all seeking to include such "must see"
programming. MVPDs' payments to broadcasters increased from $28 million
in 2005, to $2.4 billion in 2012, a nearly 8,600% increase in seven years.90
B. New Limitations on the Structure of Retransmission Consent
Negotiations
The FCC recently revised its good faith rules to prohibit the four
broadcasters with the top market share from forming a single
retransmission negotiating bloc for collectively negotiating with an
MVPD.9 ' In response to substantial increases in retransmission consent
compensation flowing from MVPDs to television broadcasters, the FCC
has created new rules that curb the bargaining power of the broadcasters
with the largest market shares.
The FCC prohibits any television broadcast station ranked among the
top four stations, as measured by audience share, from negotiating
retransmission consent jointly with another top four station, if the stations
serve the same geographic market and are not commonly owned. 9 2 Historic
joint negotiation by these stations has probably contributed to higher
retransmission consent fees because such negotiation reduces the
competition between the stations that might occur if each station negotiated
separately with an MVPD. The FCC also noted that the threat of losing
programming from two or more top four stations at the same time creates a
significant disincentive for MVPDs to reject broadcasters' financial
demands. To target collusive behavior effectively, the FCC defines "joint
negotiation" as occurring when the broadcast station representative has
received authority to negotiate, and represents the interests of two or more
stations having the largest market share either explicitly or implicitly.94
IV. The Prospect for Structural and Substantive Regulation of
ISP Interconnections
ISPs that provide downstream delivery of content, particularly
bandwidth intensive video, appear to have similarly advantageous
negotiating leverage. In particular, retail ISPs operate as terminating
90. Wheeler, supra note 83.
91. 2014 Revised Retransmission Consent Rules, supra note 12, at * 1.
92. Id
93. Id. at *5.
94. Id. at *10.
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monopolies or gateways 95 by providing the only link between content
providers and a large percentage of end users. While retail broadband
subscribers do have service options, they typically rely on only one carrier
for all delivery services and are not quick to change carriers.96 The
agreements by Nettlix and Level 3, in their capacity as a CDN, to pay
additional compensation to retail ISPs (such as Comcast and Verizon) for
improved delivery to end users, support the conclusion that ISPs can
extract higher rents for prioritizing traffic streams to provide greater
assurance that congestion will not degrade service.97
Unlike retransmission consent negotiations, ISP interconnection
and compensation agreements do not clearly fall within the ambit of
FCC oversight. Having no direct statutory authority for regulation of
information services, the FCC has attempted to assert ancillary authority
using Title I of the Communications Act. 98 On two occasions, the District
95. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 2010 Open Internet Order,
supra note 4, at 17919) (validating the FCC's conclusion that retail ISPs have market power to
control access to their subscribers).
96. The D.C. Circuit explained that:
[a]s described by numerous commenters, and detailed more thoroughly in a
Commission report compiling the results of an extensive consumer survey, the
costs of switching include: "early termination fees; the inconvenience of
ordering, installation, and set-up, and associated deposits or fees; possible
difficulty returning the earlier broadband provider's equipment and the cost of
replacing incompatible customer-owned equipment; the risk of temporarily
losing service; the risk of problems learning how to use the new service; and
the possible loss of a provider-specific email address or website."
See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 647 (citing 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 17924-25); FCC,
Broadband Decisions: What Drives Consumers to Switch-Or Stick With-Their Broadband
Internet Provider (FCC Working Paper, Dec. 2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/DOC-303264Al.pdf). Moreover, the Commission emphasized, many end
users may have no option to switch, or at least face very limited options: "[a]s of December 2009,
nearly 70 percent of households lived in census tracts where only one or two wireline or fixed
wireless firms provided" broadband service. 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 17923.
As the Commission concluded, any market power that such broadband providers might have with
respect to end users would only increase their power with respect to edge providers. Id.
97. See Netflix, supra, note 27.
98. The FCC relies on a claim of ancillary jurisdiction when the Commission lacks explicit
statutory authority to regulate. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court supports deferral to the expertise of a regulating agency "if
the intent of Congress is clear." Id. at 842-43. If "Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue," and the agency has acted pursuant to an express or implied delegation
of authority, the agency's statutory interpretation is entitled to deference, as long as it is
reasonable. Id. at 843-44. For example, the FCC successfully invoked ancillary jurisdiction
to regulate cable television even before the Commission received a statutory mandate to
do so. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (affirming FCC regulation on the
importing of distant broadcast signals by a cable television operator); United States v. Midwest
Video Corp. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming FCC rules requiring cable television operators to
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of Columbia Circuit rejected the FCC's rationale as unlawfully imposing
common carrier regulation.9 9 The court, however, did recognize that
Section 706 of the Communications Act provides the FCC with authority to
assess the market penetration of advanced telecommunications services,
including broadband, and to take steps to promote more widespread access
if the Commission identifies the need.100 This limited mandate allows the
FCC to fashion rules that promote timely and widespread broadband
access, provided the Commission does not impose common carrier
responsibilities.
Using Section 706 as its primary basis for jurisdiction, the FCC has
launched another rulemaking with an eye toward establishing lawful open
Internet rules. 0 1 The Commission proposes to oversee ISP interconnection
and compensation arrangements to ensure that deviations from
conventional nondiscriminatory best efforts routing satisfy a commercial
reasonableness standard. Opting to concentrate on language in Verizon v.
FCC,1 0 2 where the D.C. Circuit recognized a limited range of permissible
regulatory oversight,1 0 3 the FCC has proposed rules 04 that only the Democratic
Commissioners'05 consider necessaryl 0 6 and lawful.'0o
carry local broadcast stations); see also Matthew Eller, The FCC and Ancillary Power: What Can
It Truly Regulate?, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311 (2014); Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook,
95 CORNELL L. REv. 535, 572 (2010); James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the Regulated
Internet, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2010); John Blevins, Jurisdiction as
Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory ofthe FCC's Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 585 (2009); Andrew Gioia, FCC Jurisdiction Over ISPs in Protocol-Specific Bandwidth
Throttling, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 517 (2009).
99. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Verizon, 740 F.3d at 623.
100. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 641 (affirming as reasonable the FCC's determination that it has
statutory authority under section 706 of the Communications Act, as amended, to regulate ISPs
provided the Commission's rules do not impose common carrier duties).
101. See 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4.
102. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 623.
103. The FCC reads Verizon as validating efforts to use limited regulatory oversight to
preserve and facilitate the "virtuous circle" of innovation, demand for Internet services, and
deployment of broadband infrastructure. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at *7.
104. An FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking typically offers specific regulatory outcomes
that the Commission tentatively concludes are lawful and in the public interest. Under the
Administrative Procedures Act, the FCC must invite comments and generate a complete
evidentiary record to support its tentative conclusions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2014). The
proposed rules become enforceable only after the FCC issues an order that finalizes or revises the
proposed rules. Id. § 704.
105. The FCC Commissioners split the vote to approve the 2014 Open Internet NPRM on
party lines. The two Republican Commissioners issued dissents that strongly assert that the FCC
continues to lack statutory authority to impose open Internet access rules and that the
Commission should not reclassify Internet access as a telecommunications service to acquire
Title II statutory authority. See 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at *75 (dissenting
statement of Comm'r Pai); id. at *80 (dissenting statement of Comm'r O'Rielly).
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The 2014 Open Internet NPRM proposes to apply much of the same
definitions, policies, rules, and complaint resolution procedures the FCC
established in 2010.108 The Commission seeks to create more extensive
ISP reporting requirements that it believes the Verizon case endorsed as
lawful based on the FCC's statutory authority to require ISPs to operate
with transparency. 109
The FCC also proposes to re-establish the rule prohibiting ISPs from
blocking access to lawful content that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected as impermissibly imposing common carrier duties on information
service providers.110 The Commission seeks to prohibit blocking, including
the implicit requirement that ISPs not engage in any discriminatory
practices, at least for a base level of performance, which all subscribers and
upstream sources of content have a right to expect."' The Commission
106. See 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at *3 (stating that currently "there are no
legally enforceable rules by which the Commission can stop broadband providers from limiting
Internet openness" and "[i]t is in the absence of these protections for the open Internet that the
Commission must act to ensure that new legally enforceable rules are put in place. That is a gap
that must be closed as quickly as possible.").
107. See id. at *2 ("Per the blueprint [for lawful regulatory oversight] offered by the D.C. Circuit
in its decision in Verizon v. FCC, the Commission proposes to rely on section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996."). The 2014 Open Internet NPRM also proposes to "seriously
consider the use of Title II of the Communications Act as the basis for legal authority." Id.
108. See id. at *3 (tentatively concluding that "the Commission should adopt the text of the
no-blocking rule from the Open Internet Order with a revised rationale, in order to ensure that all
end users and edge providers can enjoy the use of robust, fast and dynamic Internet access"); see
also id. at *49 (tentatively concluding that "the same three means by which the Commission
focused on potential open Internet violations after the adoption of the Open Internet Order,
namely self-initiated investigation, informal complaints, and formal complaints, should be used as
well to enforce any new open Internet rules").
109. See id. at *2 (tentatively concluding that "the Commission should enhance the
transparency rule that was upheld by the D.C. Circuit so that the public and the Commission have
the benefit of sunlight on broadband provider actions and to ensure that . .. the Internet
community at large [] have the information they need to understand the services they are
receiving and to monitor practices that could undermine the open Internet").
110. The FCC explained its proposal as follows:
[T]he D.C. Circuit suggested that the Commission's 2010 no-blocking rule
could be interpreted as requiring broadband providers to "furnish . .. access to
their subscribers generally" while "establishing a lower limit on the forms that
broadband providers' arrangements with edge providers could take"-and that
under that interpretation the rule might not impose common carrier status on
broadband providers. Consistent with the court's ruling, we tentatively
conclude that the revived no-blocking rule should be interpreted as requiring
broadband providers to furnish edge providers with a minimum level of access
to their end-user subscribers.
See 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at *29.
111. Id. (citations omitted).
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tentatively concluded "that the revived no-blocking rule should be
interpreted as requiring broadband providers to furnish edge providers with
a minimum level of access to their end-user subscribers."' 1 2  The
Commission attempts to show that a rule prohibiting blocking for service
required to meet a threshold level of performance complies with the
objectives contained in section 706(a)-(b) of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996,"3 and in Title II of the Communications Act,'1 4 if the Commission
opts to reclassify Internet access as a telecommunications service.s15
For services exceeding the baseline threshold, which the Commission
tentatively analogizes to conventional "best efforts" traffic routing,1 6 the
FCC sought comments about whether it should allow ISPs to categorize
traffic streams so that some traffic can qualify for prioritization, provided
that ISPs do not degrade the performance of standard traffic delivery.'
Specifically, the FCC proposed to allow:
broadband providers to engage in individualized practices, while
prohibiting those broadband provider practices that threaten to
harm Internet openness. Our proposed approach contains three
essential elements: (1) an enforceable legal standard of conduct
barring broadband provider practices that threaten to undermine
112. Id. The FCC also proposes to subject wireless broadband ISPs to a less restrictive anti-
blocking policy consistent with its 2010 Order that prohibited blocking "lawful web content as
well as applications that compete with the mobile broadband providers' own voice or video
telephony services, subject to reasonable network management." See id. at *31.
113. Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 1301 (2014).
114. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-261 (2013).
115. The 2014 Open Internet NPRM invites comments on whether the FCC should reclassify
Internet access from the largely unregulated information service to the telecommunications
service, subject to Title II regulation that the Commission can calibrate by streamlining and
forbearing from applying all common carrier requirements:
We seek comment on whether the Commission should rely on its authority
under Title II of the Communications Act, including both (1) whether we
should revisit the Commission's classification of broadband Internet access
service as an information service and (2) whether we should separately
identify and classify as a telecommunications service a service that
"broadband providers ... furnish to edge providers." For either of these
possibilities, we seek comment on whether and how the Commission should
exercise its authority under section 10 (or section 332(c)(1) for mobile
services) to forbear from specific obligations under the Act and Commission
rules that would flow from the classification of a service as
telecommunications service.
2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at *42.
116. Id. at *30.
117. Id. at *29 (citing Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
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Internet openness, providing certainty to network providers, end
users, and edge providers alike, (2) clearly established factors that
give additional guidance on the kind of conduct that is likely to
violate the enforceable legal standard, and (3) encouragement of
individualized negotiation and, if necessary, a mechanism to allow
the Commission to evaluate challenged practices on a case-by-
case basis, thereby providing flexibility in assessing whether a
particular practice comports with the legal standard."1
Absent a reclassification of regulatory status, the prohibition against
imposing common carrier requirements on ISPs obligates the FCC to
introduce language that imposes duties that fall short of common carriage.
Consequently, the Commission proposed a nuanced approach:
It would prohibit as commercially unreasonable those broadband
providers' practices that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, threaten to harm Internet openness and all that it
protects. At the same time, it could permitbroad band [sic]
providers to serve customers and carry traffic on an individually
negotiated basis, "without having to hold themselves out to serve
all comers indiscriminately on the same or standardized terms," so
long as such conduct is commercially reasonable."19
The FCC's approach requires great finesse. On one hand, it cannot
impose clear common carrier duties on ISPs unless it reclassifies them as
telecommunications service providers, a tactic guaranteed to trigger
substantial opposition and litigation. On the other hand, the Commission
has to create rules that achieve the desired outcome of allowing ISPs to
engage in commercial negotiations that will provide specialized, arguably
"better than best efforts," routing options for single ventures without
balkanizing and dichotomizing the Internet into fast lanes available to
ventures with deep pockets and slow lanes available to ventures, including
most startups lacking the financial resources to pay surcharges.
The FCC believes it can satisfy the prohibition on common carriage
while also preventing unreasonable blockage and discrimination by
applying case precedent in which the D.C. Circuit affirmed the imposition
of private carrier interconnection requirements where commercially and
technically feasible.1 2 0 The same court, which twice reversed the FCC
118. Id.at*33.
119. Id. at 34 (citing Verizon, 740 F.3d at 652).
120. See Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining several
relevant features of data roaming rule, which "requires providers to 'offer data roaming
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open Internet rules, affirmed the Commission's rules requiring cell phone
companies to negotiate commercial terms and conditions for data
roaming. 121 The court agreed that even for private carriers, such as wireless
ISPs, the FCC can impose reasonable, non-common carrier duties to deal,
based on commercially negotiated, nonuniform terms and conditions.122
The FCC broadly justifies the need for regulatory intervention based on
the incentive1 2 3 and abilityl 2 4 of ISPs to limit Internet openness in ways that
may enhance individual carrier profitability, but at the expense of full use
of the Internet ecosystem to spur innovation, competition, free expression,
and infrastructure deployment.1 25  The Commission reminds readers that
the Verizon court did not question this conclusion: the "D.C. Circuit found
that the Commission 'adequately supported and explained' that absent open
Internet rules, 'broadband providers represent a threat to Internet openness
and could act in ways that would ultimately inhibit the speed and extent of
future broadband deployment."'l
2 6
arrangements on commercially reasonable terms and conditions,' but it permits them to
'negotiate the terms of their roaming arrangements on an individualized basis').
121. Data roaming allows wireless consumers the ability to access the Internet in locations
outside their local service area using the broadband services of a carrier with which the
customer's carrier has an interconnection agreement.
122. Cellco P'ship, 700 F.3d at 548.
123. For example, the FCC stated:
In the Open Internet Order, the Commission found that providers of
broadband Internet access service had multiple incentives to limit Internet
openness. The Order concluded that the threat of broadband provider
interference with Internet openness would be exacerbated by-but did not
depend on-such providers possessing market power over potential
subscribers in their choice of broadband provider. However, the Commission
found that most residential customers have only one or two options for
wireline broadband Internet access service, increasing the risk of market
power, and found the future of mobile Internet access service as a competing
substitute remained unclear.
2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at * 12.
124. As the FCC explained, "increasingly sophisticated network management tools enable
providers to identify and differentiate the treatment of traffic on their own broadband Internet
access service networks." Id. at *15 (quoting Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir.
2014)). Moreover, the D.C. Circuit also agreed that "little dispute that broadband providers have
the technological ability to distinguish between and discriminate against certain types of Internet
traffic." 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at * 12 (quoting Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646).
125. The FCC noted that the Verizon court "affirmed the Commission's conclusions that
vertically integrated broadband providers have incentives to interfere with competitive services
and that broadband providers generally have incentives to accept fees from edge providers." Id.
at *12 (citing Verizon, 740 F.3d at 644-45).
126. Id. at * 11 (quoting Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645); see also id. at * 12 (quoting Verizon, 740
F.3d at 644) ("The D.C. Circuit found that the Commission's assessment of broadband providers'
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V. Lessons from the Retransmission Consent Rulemaking
Process and Other Nonstructural Requirements
The FCC recently decided to prevent broadcasters from continuing to
form negotiating blocs because it had at least some empirical evidence of a
real and chronic problem. The Commission wisely chose to implement a
lawful strategy to provide consumers with possible financial relief.12 7 The
Commission could readily determine that the retransmission consent
process has evolved into an easy way for broadcasters to generate higher
revenues through increasing retransmission consent fees and by securing
MVPD paid carriage of additional, possibly less desirable, nonbroadcast
channels offered by television networks. 12 8
The FCC imposed a structural limitation that fits within the scope of
regulatory oversight accorded the Commission by Section 325 of the
Communications Act. 12 9 The Commission refrained from imposing more
aggressive regulatory intervention, such as the option of prescribing
interim carriage requirements or mandating binding dispute resolution.
All FCC Commissioners voted in favor of the rule changes, which is an
increasingly rare outcome.
Other structural safeguards in the MVPD marketplace offer guidance
on how the FCC can provide rules that enhance the ISP negotiating process
without affecting the substantive terms. For example, when a broadcaster
opts for compensation-free, "must carry" programming by MVPDs, the
broadcaster secures the right to retain the same channel number when
inserted into the inventory of MVPD content. 130 Having abandoned a claim
for compensation, broadcasters do not have to risk an MVPD decision to
assign their signal to an unfavorable channel assignment far from sources
of similar content.
incentives and economic ability to threaten Internet openness was not just supported by the record
but also grounded in 'common sense and economic reality."').
127. See 2014 Revised Retransmission Consent Rules, supra note 12, at *4 ("With
regard to Top Four broadcasters, we can confidently conclude that the harms from joint
negotiation outstrip any efficiency benefits identified and that such negotiation on balance
hurts consumers.").
128. See Matthew A. Brill and Matthew T. Murchison, How the FCC Can Protect Consumers
in the Battle Over Retransmission Consent, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.bna.com/
how-the-fcc-can-protect-consumers-in-the-battle-over-retransmission-consent/.
129. 2014 Revised Retransmission Consent Rules, supra note 12, at *60 (interpreting section
325(b)(3)(A) of the Communications Act as authorizing the Commission to prevent broadcast
stations having the top four market shares from jointly negotiating retransmission consent agreements).
130. Channel 20 TV Co. v. Bresnan Commc'ns, 25 F.C.C.R 2219, 2220 (2010)
(memorandum opinion and order) (ordering a cable operator to assign the same channel number
when carrying a broadcast television station); see also 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(6) (2014); 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.57(a), 76.57(f) (2014); Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals: Amendments to
Part 76 of the Commission's Rules, 23 FCC Rcd. 14254 (2008) (declaratory order).
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The FCC has also addressed channel placement when imposing or
incorporating conditions to a controversial merger. When the FCC
approved Comcast's acquisition of NBC Universal, the Commission
applied a condition requiring Comcast to retain programming "neighborhoods"
with networks offering similar content. 13 1 The Commission reasoned that,
without a procedure for requiring parity in channel placement, Comcast
might opt to locate its owned or affiliated networks in favorable locations
while relegating competitor networks to unfavorable channel
assignments. 13 2  The FCC required Comcast to comply with this channel
placement commitment by placing the unaffiliated Bloomberg Business network
in close proximity to the channel assigned to the affiliated CNBC network.133
On the other hand, the FCC overreaches if and when it makes
substantive decisions about where and how an MVPD offers specific types
of content. For example, the D.C. Circuit reversed an FCC decision
requiring Comcast to offer tier similar type content on the same
programming, without regard to whether the company has an ownership
interest in the network packaging the programming.1 34 The FCC required
Comcast to place the unaffiliated Tennis Channel on the same
programming tier as the company had assigned for its affiliated Golf
Channel. 135  The court reversed the FCC's decision evidencing little
concern that Comcast might intentionally have disadvantaged a competitor
of its own programming. The court instead based its decision rejecting
parity in channel placement on the failure of the FCC and the Tennis
Channel to provide concrete evidence that Comcast gave up financial gain
to penalize the Tennis Channel. 136
The Tennis Channel might have generated better ratings and more
demand by Comcast subscribers to receive the channel if Comcast had not
131. Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co. and NBC Universal, Inc. for
Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4241 (2011) (requiring Comcast to negotiate fairly with
unaffiliated content providers for the carriage of their content).
132. Id.
133. Within one year of its merger approval, the FCC launched an investigation regarding
whether Comcast violated a condition by refusing to assign Bloomberg Television a channel
assignment in the same "community" of channels assigned to similar news and business news
networks. See Bloomberg L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC, 27 FCC Red. 4891,
4891 (2012) (granting in part Bloomberg's complaint that its 24-hour business news channel,
Bloomberg Television, is an "independent news channel" covered by the "news neighborhooding"
condition adopted in the conditional approval of Comcast's acquisition of NBC Universal).
134. Tennis Channel, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, L.L.C., 27 FCC Rcd. 8508 (2012)
(memorandum opinion and order), pet. for stay denied 27 FCC Red. 9274 (2012), rev'd
Comcast Cable Commc'ns. LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1287
(2014).
135. Id.
136. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, 717 F.3d at 986.
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placed the network on a more expensive and less viewed sports
programming tier. That possibility, however, did not legally support the
FCC's attempt to level the competitive playing field for the two types of
programming action that would usurp Comcast's commercial judgment.
The FCC's prudent and measured response to a problem in
retransmission consent negotiations provides a proper model for how the
Commission should respond to calls for aggressive and possibly intrusive
regulatory oversight of ISP interconnection and compensation negotiations.
The new retransmission consent rules respond to an identifiable and
measurable problem: MVPD rate increases well in excess of a commonly
used index of consumer prices, with recent increases raising the per
channel cost of service.m13  The rules fit within the scope of lawful
regulatory action. FCC action did not impact the substantive aspects of
negotiations, only their structure. Thus, by addressing procedure, the FCC
can impact the negotiating process in ways that serve the public interest
without unfairly and unlawfully imposing substantive terms and conditions.
Like retransmission consent agreements, the terms and conditions of
ISP interconnection arrangements have a direct impact on consumers, both
in terms of service rates and the sustainability of competition. The FCC
assumes that consumers and the public interest will suffer in the absence of
rules that constrain both the structure of interconnection negotiations
and their substantive outcomes. When the Commission moves into the
realm of substantive, commercial negotiations, it risks substituting its
judgment on what is commercially reasonable for what two parties have
negotiated at arm's length.
Negotiations for retransmission consent and retail ISP traffic delivery
to end users both require cooperation by a venture for which no readily
available altemative exists. Unless the FCC repeals the network and syndicated
exclusivity rules, MVPDs must negotiate with a specific local broadcaster.
Likewise a CDN or conventional ISP must negotiate with specific retail
ISPs for access to subscribers solely relying on that carrier for last mile
delivery of content. Whether by regulation or market forces, these forced
partnerships can confer superior negotiating leverage on one party:
broadcasters with "must see" content and retail ISPs providing the
137. The FCC reported that the average monthly price of expanded basic cable service
increased overall by 5.1% in the year ending January 1, 2013, while the average price per channel
increased by 2.1%. Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and
Equipment, Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. and
Competition Act of 1992, MM Docket No. 92-266, DA 14-672, ¶ 1 (F.C.C. May 16, 2014),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/report-average-rates-cable-programming-service-and-
equipment-2. The Consumer Price Index increased 1.6% during the same period. Id. at ¶ 3.
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content termination link selected by a significant percentage of
broadband consumers.
Ventures perceiving a negotiating advantage surely want to exploit it,
but the justification of regulatory intervention requires both statutory
authority and empirical evidence that consumers suffer. Sections 325 and 706
of the Communications Act provide a variable degree of certainty as to
whether statutory authority exists. To apply either section, the FCC has to
compile an evidentiary record showing that consumer harm requires
regulatory intervention. For retransmission consent negotiations, the FCC
has erected a process to assess whether the parties have negotiated in good
faith, using specific criteria and applying a macro-level assessment.
The FCC can examine why the parties could not reach closure on
commercial negotiations before a deadline triggered a "blackout."
The FCC also has legal authority to respond to interconnection dispute
complaints from ISPs and service degradation complaints from ISP
subscribers.13 8 The Commission should compile an evidentiary record that
includes a forensic examination of what has prevented the parties from
reaching closure before consumers suffer outages and other types of service
degradation. In many instances, the parties will dispute the causes for
congestion and the manner in which it can be ameliorated. Without
affecting the substantive terms contained in a new agreement, the FCC
should impose light-handed structural safeguards that promote timely and
transparent resolution of complaints presented to it by an aggrieved party.
The Commission can determine the causes for a dispute only if it has
access to interconnection agreements and explanations from parties as to
why an outage or congestion occurred, notwithstanding a previously
acceptable and working arrangement. ISPs zealously shroud their
interconnection arrangements for obvious and legitimate commercial
reasons, but an in-camera investigation by the FCC, with redacted public
138. while rejecting the FCC's Open Internet rules prohibiting discrimination and content
blocking rules as too close to the imposition of common carrier requirements, the D.C. Circuit
recently allowed the Commission to fashion rules that promote Internet innovation, accessibility
and market penetration. Verizon v. FCC, 700 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The court stated that
the FCC "has more than adequately supported and explained its conclusion that edge-provider
innovation leads to the expansion and improvement of broadband infrastructure." Id. at 644.
The court also concluded that the FCC's finding that "Internet openness fosters the edge-provider
innovation that drives this 'virtuous cycle' was likewise reasonable and grounded in substantial
evidence." Id. Clearly resolving complaints on an ad hoc basis support these judicially validated
objectives. See id The FCC reports that its 2014 Open Internet NPRM responds to consumer
complaints: "In light of the consumer complaints discussed above, we also consider
enhancements to the existing rule with respect to the content, form, and method of broadband
providers' disclosures to end users." 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 4, at *21; see also 47
C.F.R. §§ 8.12-8.17 (2013) (delineating the process for filing a formal complaint with the FCC).
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disclosure, can help answer essential questions about what circumstances
have changed so that previously satisfactory terms no longer work.
The FCC has lawful authority to ensure that consumers understand
what services they are buying and what commitments ISPs make even
without regulated tariffs.139 Such authority includes the lawful authority to
determine why an ISP could not achieve its service commitments for all
traffic, certain types of traffic, and specific upstream sources of traffic. If
an ISP can no longer deliver bandwidth intensive video content at a
sufficiently high speed to assure acceptable display on end user televisions,
personal computers, smartphones, and tablets, then the ISP has a duty to
explain the reason. If the degradation in delivery results from changed
circumstances, including a substantial increase in the amount of capacity
seeking downstream delivery, then the terminating carrier has provided the
FCC with an adequate explanation. The Commission has lawful authority
to examine the procedural and nonsubstantive reasons why the parties have
failed to reach a timely resolution to a dispute, but not to prescribe
commercial terms and conditions, or to determine whether the parties have
reached a fair settlement despite the lack of parity in negotiating leverage.
The inability to affect substantive terms, in both retransmission and ISP
carriage negotiations, may prevent the FCC from facilitating dispute
resolution before content becomes temporarily unavailable to consumers.
The lack of access by consumers, however, may generate the kind of
consumer pushback and outrage that can force the parties to get serious.
In light of widespread media coverage and consumer responses to outages,
parties opting for a delay or bad faith strategy may suffer in the court of
public opinion. For example, Netflix appears to reduce the superior
negotiation leverage of retail ISPs simply by compiling and disseminating a
scorecard that shows near term bit transmission performance of various
carriers.1 4 0 Consumers of retail ISPs reported to have declining and inferior
service may consider these possibly contestable statistics as solid proof that
the retail ISP has caused congestion through neglect and the failure to make
timely and necessary upgrades. 14 1 While consumers may not "vote with
139. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2401 (2013) (stating the "Truth-in-Billing Requirements");
Truth-in-Billing Format, CC Docket No. 98-170, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 7492 (1999); see also, e.g.,Truth-In-Billing Format,
24 FCC Rcd. 11380, 11399 (2009); Empowering Consumers to Prevent and Detect Billing for
Unauthorized Charges ("Cramming"), 27 FCC Rcd. 4436, 27 FCC Rcd. 13989 (2012).
140. See NETFLIX, USA ISP Speed Index Results Graph, http://ispspeedindex.netflix.
com/results/usa/graph (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
141. In a few retransmission negotiations, broadcast networks-such as Fox and CBS-have
opted to block access to alternative sources of "must see" content by tracking the Internet
Protocol address of consumers seeking content at a content aggregation site, such as Hulu, or the
networks own web site. Brian Stelter, Internet Is a Weapon in Cable Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
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their dollars" in significant numbers by changing carriers, retail ISPs
reported as derelict face a public relations and marketing dilemma possibly
resolved by changing interconnection strategies. Lawsuits alleging
commercial defamation by a content provider probably would compound
the ISP's problems.1 4 2
It appears that ample options exist for most retransmission and ISP
interconnection negotiations to reach closure without extensive delay and posturing.
Considering the advantages of stalling service and bad faith negotiations,
ventures have to assess the downsides of such strategy, including an
extremely bad public image, particularly if they also want regulatory
approval for commercial transactions, such as a merger. If the FCC can use
discipline and modesty to refrain from making substantive decisions
affecting commercial transactions, it will find that its nonstructural and
procedural requirements can work effectively.
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/business/media/20hulu.html?-r-0; Bill Carter, After a
Fee Dispute With Time Warner Cable, CBS Goes Dark for Three Million Viewers, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/business/media/time-warner-
cable-removes-cbs-in-3-big-markets.html. This strategy may backfire because consumers will
know the specific cause of the blockage. Instead of gaining negotiation leverage, the broadcast
network might come across as using unfair tactics by denying consumers access to content readily
available to all other broadband subscribers located outside markets where a retransmission
consent dispute is taking place.
142. Marguerite Reardon, Verizon Threatens to Sue Nettlix Over Congestion Claims, CNET
(June 5, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/verizon-threatens-netflix-with-lawsuit-over-congestion-
accusations/.
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